Proofs of Space



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ASCrypto, Oct 3rd 2023

Yesterday's Talk
(by Arantxa)

Witness w for a relation R(x,w)

Prwoof!
(proof)



Today: proofs yes; but proofs of "resources"

Can we construct a proof which persuades we are *spending* a *certain (amount of) resource* X?



Resource=Space



Resource=Time

Fighting Junk Mail (Spam)

Fighting Junk Mail Through *PoW* (Proofs of Work)

[DworkNaor (Crypto92)]

Proof of ”work” (or, CPU cycles)

I will not consider the email ”received” unless the PoW checks

Rationale:

- Spammers’ model: ”send cheaply a vast volume of mail”
- PoW now requires them to spend some amount per email (e.g. 0.0000005 cents)
- Not convenient any more in bulk
- **NB:** this is still OK for the honest (occasional) sender

A Simple Example of Proofs of Work



- **Hash-based:**
  - **Puzzle**: Sample random x (this is our challenge)
  - **Solution**: find r such that we find a certain amount of trailing zeroes

    H(x||r) = 0x(…*anything*…)000…000

  - **Intuition**: If there are M trailing zeroes this requires roughly 2^M on average
  - **To check the solution as a verifier:** receive r; check trailing zeroes in H(x||r)
    - (verifying is way faster than searching for the solution)

The single thing I want you to learn from this talk if you really *really* want to mentally leave right now

- PoW can save cat lives from spammers
  - (non-joke version: PoW is useful against spam)
- You can make a PoW by using some hash thing-y

(assuming the hash output looks random enough)

Next on proofs of work (I lied: I would you like to take away a little bit more out of this talk)

- **Definition**: What does a definition for PoW look like?
- **Applications:** What are other applications for PoW?
- **Caveats**: what are limitations of applying Proofs of Work?

Defining PoW: Syntax

Proof of Work

At a high level, a *Proof of Work* involves three algorithms:

- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$ is a randomized algorithm that produces a *challenge* $\boldsymbol{c}$.
- $\mathsf{Solve}(\boldsymbol{c})$ is an algorithm that solves the challenge $\boldsymbol{c}$, producing a solution $\boldsymbol{s}$.
- $\mathsf{Verify}(\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{s})$ is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that verifies the solution $\boldsymbol{s}$ to $\boldsymbol{c}$.

From Ball et al. 2017 (“Proofs of Useful Work”) https://ia.cr/2017/203

Defining PoW: What about Security?

- This standard definition template won't work:
  - "For all PPT * Adv … then Adv cannot win a certain game"

Gen(…) -> c

c

"bad" solution

Verify(c, bad_solution) =1

PPT ~

We are content with

* PPT: Probabilistic Polynomial Time

Defining PoW: Intuition for the right def

- Denote by T* := Time(Eval(c)) (honest solver's time)
- For all adversaries running in time << T*
- This happens with very high probability:

Gen(…) -> c

c

”bad” solution

Verify(c, bad_solution) =0 (we do not accept)

Are we done?

One more thing:

amortization should be impossible.

If I ask you 100 challenges you should spend roughly 100 T* work.

Applications of Proofs of Work

- Fighting Spam/Denial-of-Service
- Bulletin Boards
  - (next block in a chain)



The second thing I want you to make sure you take from this talk in case you want to start snoozing now

When definining PoW:

- We do not use PPTs (as usual in cryptography); we specify the power of the adversary.
- We need to be careful about *amortization*.

Applications: denial of service in general; bullettin boards (e.g. Bitcoin)

Questions?

The third thing I want you to take from this talk before you start fantasizing about lunch

PoW have limitations.

Limitations/Caveats of PoW

- Waste
- The problem of ASICs*:
  - Or the ”Honest/Malicious gap”

*ASICs: Application-Specific Integrated Circuits

Issue: Waste of Energy in PoW

How to mitigate the problem of energy waste?

- Option 1:
  - Shifting to other resources (e.g. space)
- Option 2:
  - Actually making them ”useful”: using that grinding for “natural problems”

Mitigating Waste: Make PoW *Useful*

- The classic hash-based PoW does “nothing useful”
- Can we obtain a PoW that is “useful”?
- **Intuition**: “the grinding we are proving can be used for something else”
- **Example**: PrimeCoin (2013)
  - Introduces PoW based on search for prime numbers

A Syntax for Proofs of Useful Work

Standard Proof of Work

At a high level, a *Proof of Work* involves three algorithms:

- $\mathsf{Gen}(1^n)$ is a randomized algorithm that produces a *challenge* $\boldsymbol{c}$.
- $\mathsf{Solve}(\boldsymbol{c})$ is an algorithm that solves the challenge $\boldsymbol{c}$, producing a solution $\boldsymbol{s}$.
- $\mathsf{Verify}(\boldsymbol{c}, \boldsymbol{s})$ is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that verifies the solution $\boldsymbol{s}$ to $\boldsymbol{c}$.

Proof of Useful Work

- $\mathsf{Gen}(\boldsymbol{x})$ is a randomized algorithm that takes an instance $\boldsymbol{x}$ and produces a *challenge* $\boldsymbol{c_x}$.
- $\mathsf{Solve}(\boldsymbol{c_x})$ is an algorithm that solves the challenge $\boldsymbol{c_x}$, producing a solution sketch $\boldsymbol{s}$.
- $\mathsf{Verify}(\boldsymbol{c_x}, \boldsymbol{s})$ is a randomized algorithm that verifies the solution sketch $\boldsymbol{s}$ to the challenge $\boldsymbol{c_x}$.
- $\mathsf{Recon}(\boldsymbol{c_x}, \boldsymbol{s})$ is an algorithm that given a valid $\boldsymbol{s}$ for $\boldsymbol{c_x}$ reconstructs $f(\boldsymbol{x})$.

From Ball et al. 2017 (“Proofs of Useful Work”) https://ia.cr/2017/203

Examples of Proofs of Useful Work



Orthogonal Vectors Conjecture

for $d = \omega(\log n)$, $\forall \varepsilon > 0$,
OV cannot be solved in time
$O(n^{2-\varepsilon})$
[Williams'05]

Other natural examples: 3SUM, etc…

Credits to Marshal Ball for pics

Another Limitation: the ”ASIC” problem

Standard HW

Specialized HW for hashing (ASIC)

Incentive: making them pay 0.0000005 cents

They will not pay the same anymore!

Last slides

- Proof of Work
  - Limitations:
    - can be wasteful, ASICs can raise the bar for honest parties
  - Mitigating waste
    - Useful Work
- What we will look at next:
  - Proof of Space
    - Same application realms
    - Our hope is to remove the limitations we saw:
      - Reduce the energy waste (we will talk about usefulness first)
      - Removing the ”ASIC problem”

Proofs of Space
(an intuition through our old friend: spam)

Proof of ”space”



I will not consider the email ”received” unless the PoS checks

The hoped guarantee: the adversary is must have used Y amount of space if proof checks

Why would this address PoW’s limitations?

- **Energy:** CPU vs RAM (or disk)
- **”ASIC”:** no equivalent for memory that can provide savings of orders of magnitude like ASICs did for CPU

Applications: Making Proofs of Space *Useful*

- Applications of PoS (Proofs of Space)
  - Could be the same as before:
    - Figthing denial of service, etc.
    - Consensus for next block (Chia)
  - Or more (e.g., through usefulness)
    - By analogy, *usefulness* in PoW was: “I am using grinding for computation f(x)” (where f is some natural function)
    - “Natural usefulness in PoS”: let’s use PoS to **guarantee storage of useful files**
      - (E.g., data sets, Wikipedia, the web in general)
    - => System where we you can obtain cryptographic incentives of somebody using a certain amount of space AND using it that space for storing a specific file

Earlier during this talk:

Then



Now



Proof of Useful Space:
System where we you can obtain cryptographic incentives of somebody using a certain amount of space AND using it that space for storing a specific file

Next: I want to give a flavor of how one can define this

A syntax for Proofs of Useful Space



clg ← *Challenge(digest)*

clg

prf ← *Respond(aux, clg)*

prf

prf ← *Verify(digest, clg, prf)*

Security intuition: "*If prf checks then Prover is storing a certain amount of storage related to F*"

A non-solution





Check F against digest by hashing

Security intuition: "*If prf checks then Prover is storing a certain amount of storage related to F*"

A non-solution—Issue 1: succinctness



Security intuition: "*If prf checks then Prover is storing a certain amount of storage related to F*"

A non-solution—Issue 2: space requirement



clg

prf =

Which requirements does this construction satisfy?

Space requirement

Security intuition: *"If prf checks then Prover is storing a certain amount of storage related to F"*

"Usefulness" requirement

A non-solution—Issue 2: space requirement



Thea naïve solution does not work.
So how do we solve these problems??



More resources and wrap up

- https://proofofspace.org/references
- Filecoin.io



For any other questions:
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Thanks!